translated title, The Case Law System in America, and edited by Paul Gewirtz, should eliminate any excuse for students of Realism to ignore this important work, and should as well provide a useful synopsis of much of Llewellyn's thinking for those whose exposure might previously have consisted only of The Bramble Bush and isolated excerpts from The Common Law Tradition. 7 The Case Law System in America, as befits its provenance as a series of lectures to a German audience, contains much that genuinely is only an introduction for the novice. Consequently, most American readers can skim with little fear of loss the various parts of this short book that deal with the structure of American courts (pp. 27-34) , the nature of the citation system (pp. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , and the technicalities of civil procedure (pp. 34-42) . Much more of the book, however, is far removed from simple factual exposition, and sets forth insightfully, creatively, and controversially many distinctly Llewellynesque ideas about how the American system of common law decisionmaking actually operates.
Perhaps the most important of these ideas, important precisely because it has been so little heeded, is Llewellyn's recurrent call for sociological inquiry into the nature of legal decisionmaking (pp. 9-12, 89-113) . A sociological approach to legal decisionmaking stands in opposition to the now common normative mode of legal scholarship, in which prescribing desirable results to judges is the norm and everything else the exception. By contrast, throughout this book, as in much of the rest of his work, Llewellyn urges those who wish to understand the legal system to assess externally and empirically the actual nature of judicial decisionmaking, and to do so systematically rather than anecdotally. As this book makes clear, it is undoubtedly Llewellyn's view that such inquiry would show the extent to which there are indeed patterns of dealing with precedent as well as predictable patterns of judicial decisionmaking. These patterns, however, diverge more often than not from those that might be perceived simply from a literal reading of judicial opinions.
As Professor Gewirtz's introduction makes plain (pp. xvii-xxii), there is another dominant theme of this book: the continuing interplay between, on the one hand, a greater degree of judicial freedom in the use of precedents than classical legal theory would acknowledge and, on the other, the way in which a wide range of acculturating forces is likely to lead to that freedom being exercised by judges in largely parallel ways. The interplay of judicial freedom and acculturating forces results in more constraint than an exclusive focus on judi- REv. 395 (1950). cial freedom or leeway would acknowledge, and consequently more ability to predict judicial decisions than one who had assimilated only the crudest and most caricatured forms of Realism would expect. Llewellyn's focus, then, is on the recurring patterns of lawyerly behavior, and on the degree of constraint and predictability that such recurring patterns facilitate. This concern shows the extent to which Llewellyn was among the most moderate of the Realists.
There can be little doubt that shared experiences bring shared perspectives. Because appellate judges are universally drawn from the ranks of practicing lawyers, and because practicing lawyers are almost universally characterized by having spent three years in American law schools more similar to each other than they are different, it should come as little surprise that the universe of appellate judg_es does not replicate in all respects the characteristics of the universe of human beings. Partly because of the internalization of professional norms of lawyering and judging, partly because such norms serve to create and reinforce a somewhat autonomou~ professional culture, 8 and partly because of the self-selection that leads some people to become lawyers and others not (to say nothing of the social forces that lead some people to have the opportunity of becoming lawyers and others not), and some lawyers to become judges and others not (to say nothing of the social forces that lead some lawyers to have the opportunity of becoming judges and others not 9 ), the range of likely appellate judicial reac-· tions to a given problem is narrower than that of the population at large. Moreover, this narrowness is exacerbated by the way in which the methods, institutions, and structures of appellate decisionmaking themselves exercise a constraining force beyond that exercised by the similarity of perspective among the individuals inhabiting those institutions.
Still, there is another story to be told, and it is one that Llewellyn consistently avoids. Just as lawyers share much in common, so too do they differ in psychological makeup, political perspective, personal background, and self-understanding of their role. Although Llewellyn pays lip service to these and other sources of difference, he continuously focuses on the ways in which appellate judges see things similarly rather than differently. 9. The parallel structure of the parentheticals should not be taken to be making a parallel statistical claim. To the contrary, it is quite possible that the opportunity to become a judge given that one is a lawyer is far greater than the opportunity to become a lawyer given that one is a resident of the United States.
10. Jerome Frank, Llewellyn's contemporary, and many modem scholars do not ignore the existence of differences among judges or the effect of those differences. [Vol. 89:1295 The extent to which differences in background, social situation, psychological makeup, and political outlook make a difference in the outcome of judicial decisionmaking is likely to be a function of the size of the space within which judicial discretion operates. Here again Llewellyn's jurisprudential conservatism (which bears no necessary relation to political conservatism) comes through, a conservatism even more apparent now than perhaps it was then. Foreshadowing the contemporary work of Priest and Klein and others, 11 Llewellyn notes in this book that "we may pretty safely say, almost every case on appeal to a court oflast resort could be decided just as easily, legally speaking, for the plaintiff as for the defendant" (p. 8). This to Llewellyn is decidedly not a statement about the essentially indeterminate nature of legal reasoning. Rather, it is a statement about the incentives that lead some issues to be disputed and others not, some disputes to be tried and others not, and some trial court decisions to be appealed and others not.
It is hard to get around this dilemma. If the proper outcome of the case were not really a matter of doubt, how is it that an honest, competent judge in the court of first instance could decide it "incorrectly"? Again, if the outcome of the case were not really in doubt, how is it that an honest, competent attorney could burden his client with the time and expense of an appeal if the trial court has rendered a "correct" judgment? The very fact that there is an appeal usually proves that doubts exist among professionals, unless the attorney is using the appeal merely as a dilatory tactic. [p. 8] At this point in the argument Llewellyn appears agnostic about what it is that makes a case such that it could be decided, "just as easily, legally speaking, for the plaintiff as for the defendant" (p. 8). Throughout the book, however, he appears less agnostic, often expressing views sympathetic to the position that rules with an "invariant wording" (p. 73) would with little doubt "encompass many cases" (p. 73). "Insofar as these cases were known to the lawmaker before the rule was laid down, and insofar as circumstances have remained un-. changed since that time, one can work with the rule deductively" (p. 73). Only when "the possibility of doubt arises" (p. 73) does the situation become different.
Similarly, Llewellyn claims that there are cases [such] that.no one has any doubt about how to handle [them] , but that no one had in mind when the rule was created. Nonetheless anyone who looked at the case and the rule at the same time would "recognize" that the case must be governed by the rule. Here I maintain that no real "interpretation" of the rule is taking place. [p. 74] None of this is crystal clear in the book, and interpretations other than my own are plausible. Still, much of this strikes me as making the essentially positivist (in Dworkin's sense 12 ) claim that there is a body of doctrine called "the rules of law," that those rules have centers and peripheries that largely track the centers and peripheries of the meaning of their component linguistic parts, and that cases lying within the centers are such that competent lawyers recognize them as such; the consequence being that such cases are rarely disputed and even more rarely appealed to courts of last resort. As a result, the cases that are so disputed and appealed are the skewed sample of cases lying on the peripheries of the legal rules, such peripheries being themselves determined by recourse to linguistic meaning and little else.
The remarkable modesty of this claim becomes apparent upon consideration of an alternative explanation for the selection hypothesis. Suppose the legal system were such that the rules of law were taken merely as transparent probabilistic guides (rules of thumb) to morally correct results. In such a system it would be legitimate for a legal decisionmaker, such as a judge, to disregard a legal rule even within the center of its linguistic extension when application of that rule to some case would produce a morally incorrect result. Were that the case, even competent lawyers would have reason to create a dispute, bring a case to trial, or appeal an unfavorable result whenever they felt they could maintain a plausible argument for moral correctness, even if the plain linguistic meaning of a plainly applicable legal rule inclined in exactly the opposite direction. This is not, however, to deny the operation of the selection hypothesis. Even were moral correctness a winning legal argument it would still be true that only those cases in which two competent lawyers felt somewhat confident in advancing opposing positions would be disputed, tried, or appealed. But the array of cases so selected, although still unrepresentative of all legal 12. I append the parenthetical to note that I am referring here to positivism in the sense of a limited and pedigreeable set of materials extensionally divergent from a society's totality of accepted social norms. This is the sense of positivism that Dworkin attacks in R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-130 (1977) , and R. DWORKIN, LAW 'S EMPIRE (1986) [Vol. 89:1295 events, would be different, now representing an array of cases of moral doubt rather than of linguistic doubt.
Most readers will recognize this picture as similar to Dworkin's picture of the legal system. And if we substitute "social" for "moral" we come closer to Eisenberg's account of the nature of the common law. 13 Other variants could be added as well. But the point I wish to make here is that even if Llewellyn is right about the concentration of hard cases in appellate courts, and about the consequent fallacy of generalizing from those "borderline" cases to the operation and effect oflaw in society at large (p. 1), little about the nature oflegal decisionmaking follows from this premise. Llewellyn appears to think that the chief distinction between hard cases and easy ones derives from their linguistic/doctrinal extension, hardly a radical and hardly a Realist conclusion, and one diverging substantially from the picture that one would get from reading Frank or others similarly inclined.
That Llewellyn is a "conservative" on this aspect of legal theory does not necessarily make him wrong. Indeed, if (as he himself suggests) we take his view of doctrinal dominance as presumptive rather than conclusive, his conclusions strike me as largely correct. 14 Yet in terms of many enduring debates about the nature of legal decisionmaking, it is nonetheless true that Llewellyn's comparatively narrow view of the determinants of legal doubt hardly puts him in the forefront of extreme challenges to traditional understandings of how the law operates.
Llewellyn's doubts are limited in a quite different sense as well. Although he occasionally acknowledges the cultural contingency of the various stabilizing factors that his work is noted for identifying (p. 10), Llewellyn just as often transmits the message of inevitability, such as when he claims that the gravitation toward moderately strong precedential constraint is the natural course of all lawyers and all legal systems (pp. 48-49) . Surely to describe as both inevitable and inevitably desirable the control by the past that is necessarily part of any system that takes precedent seriously requires far more showing than we get here or anywhere else in Llewellyn's work. Llewellyn's position presupposes views about either the desirability of an existing state of affairs or the desirability of stability for stability's sake that can hardly be called necessary or universal. 15 This is not to deny that some states of affairs may be worth entrenching, nor that stability for stability's sake might sometimes be desirable. When such goals are sought, a system of precedent is often a valuable instrument. But at certain times and in certain places there can be reasonable doubts 13. M. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
14. See Schauer, Formalism, 91 YALE L.J. 509, 544-48 (1988 about whether to entrench a state of affairs and about the value of stability for stability's sake, 16 doubts that Llewellyn rarely seems to express.
In similar fashion, Llewellyn rarely expresses doubts about the choices that are built into the constraining factors he properly identifies. His faith in judges (if only they become self-aware), in the bar, and in the legal institutions providing the constraints is largely unclouded by doubts about the choices built into these constraints. He is rarely critical, for example, of the process of selecting lawyers whose uniform training and acculturation provides one of his stabilizing factors, nor of an adversary system of decisionmaking whose special style dampens potential diversity of decisions. Nor is Llewellyn's faith tested by the consideration of alternative arrangements that might provide equally constraining but substantively different constraint. Just as he appears relatively confident that doctrinal and linguistic uncertainty is the major source of legal uncertainty, so too does heappear equally confident that the sources of legal certainty are as fixed a part of the social landscape as are the rules of language. What emerges from this book, therefore, is an impression, at least partly attributable to what happens to most of us when we are called upon to explain our own system in other countries, 17 of a Llewellyn both far more committed to the existence of legal determinacy and far more uncritically appreciative of its sources than the standard picture either of Llewellyn or of Realism in general would have led many to expect.
Realism is as much a part of the American legal landscape as it is widely misunderstood, and much the same can be said of Llewellyn. In light of that, this sensitively translated and edited work, now accessible partly because of its brevity but mostly because of the skill of those who have brought it to us, should be required reading for those who seek to understand the development of American legal thought and the operation of the common law in appellate courts. None of my skepticism about Llewellyn's message applies at all to the enterprise of making it available. 17. However much we may criticize or be skeptical of our own systems when we are home, explaining those systems abroad often brings out defenses and justifications that would otherwise seem embarrassing.
